Or, A list of things because apparently lists help to overcome blogging inertia (especially on Mondays, but this happens to be a Tuesday)
1. I have to come up with a third fake company name. Hasturcom is my current employer; LENG Engineering is my previous employer. Now that I'm being seriously considered for a position with yet a third employer, I need to come up with a third name.
2. "LENG" is short for "LENG ENGineering". It's recursive!
3. My company names are based on the works of H. P. Lovecraft. So I dunno... "NyarlathoTech", maybe?
4. I prefer to put punctuation outside of quotation marks, unless they're part of the quote. Since I've left the school environment, I figured it didn't matter too much, and formed a pretty strong habit of this. Then I re-entered the school environment. Turns out the rules of punctuation haven't changed while I was gone. Now, for the first time in ten years, it matters. Argh.
5. I still owe you all a definition of "Gibson". To me, a Gibson is a sign that the future is upon us. The rapidly-approaching widespread use of cell phones to do banking is a Gibson (or will be, when it hits). The advent of steam-powered ironclads with guns mounted in turrets was a Gibson from a previous period of history. The quintessential Gibson is the H3: a smaller version of the Hummer that appeared in William Gibson's novel Pattern Recognition a year before Hummer unveiled the real thing.
6. Driving through the Cental Valley this weekend, I saw an old small-town water tower adorned with cellular network antennas. That's another kind of "Gibson": the future stuck onto the past.
7. Information Promiscuity: Mrs. C. posts our weekend vacation schedule and itinerary on Facebook. Me? I say no to Facebook apps that request access to my profile.
8. I plan to post my thoughts on the battle of Gettysburg, Real Soon Now.
9. Movies I plan to put in my Netflix queue, that have "9" in the title: 9 and District 9.
Showing posts with label war. Show all posts
Showing posts with label war. Show all posts
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
Friday, August 28, 2009
Western Military Theorists I Have Read Lately
In Chronological Order
A few years back, Mrs. C. bought me a reprinted collection of works by military theorists. It was originally published in the early 20th century (between WW1 and WW2). Lately I've been working my way through them.
Vegetius
This guy was a historian in the later period of the Roman Empire. He took it upon himself to review earlier Greek and Roman military theories and practices, and compile a summary of the high points. The stated purpose of the work was to advise the current Roman emperor of the best way to (re)organize his army, which like the rest of Rome had become decadent and weak.
The result is a surprisingly simple, straightforward book. It covers such topics as recruiting standards, equipment and training, order of battle, and establishment of camps. It also describes the chain of command and the duties of the officers of various ranks. And of course it reviews the Roman system of battle.
One of the most interesting arguments Vegetius makes is that the Roman armies of old were victorious in part because of their small size. Larger armies become too difficult to manage; better to field a smaller army, well trained and confident in the strength of its arms, under the direct command of a single general. He cites several historical examples of smaller, more agile Roman armies handily defeating much larger, unwieldy enemies.
Supposedly Vegetius was very highly regarded by strategists and generals during the Middle Ages. This makes sense, since the arms of that time would not have been much different from the arms of the Roman Empire.
De Saxe
A German officer who spent most of his career in French service, De Saxe formed his opinions of warfare during the early days of gunpowder, and it shows in his writing.
De Saxe proposed a reform of the armies of the day, into smaller units along classical Roman lines. He is credited by some military historians as being the father of the modern division-based army organization.
Gunpowder weapons being much less reliable and effective then than they later became, De Saxe argued against the practice of having the infantry fire while they advanced. He saw this as a waste of time that interrupted their charge, robbed them of their forward momentum, and left them vulnerable to a more aggressive opponent. He preferred the infantry to charge directly into hand-to-hand combat, exploiting the weakness of an enemy that had not taken his advice.
He had several other innovative recommendations, including a lightweight field gun that could move and fire in support of infantry action, rather than the larger artillery pieces, which comprised a separate arm of their own.
My favorite part of De Saxe's work is his note at the end, where he explains that he had written the entire thing during a seven day period while suffering from a fever, for his own amusement.
De Saxe was reportedly very popular with the strategists and commanders who came after him, throughout the Napoleonic period.
Frederick the Great
De Saxe died before gunpowder weapons technology had improved very much, and before anybody had gotten around to trying the reforms he suggested.
Frederick II, King of Prussia, deserves a lot of credit for putting De Saxe's ideas into practice, and also for coming up with many excellent ideas of his own.
As a young man, Frederick wanted nothing more than to be an artist. He even ran away to England to get away from his father, who had a more martial career in mind for him. But when his father died, and Frederick took the throne, he transformed into one of the greatest warlords in the history of the western world.
At that time, Prussia was a small nation with large, belligerent neighbors eager to add this tasty morsel to their domains. They would even form alliances with each other, for the purpose of conquering Prussia and dividing the spoils amongst themselves.
Frederick dealt with this problem by forming a well-trained, highly mobile army. He was renowned for the rapidity of his marches, and his ability to deploy his forces with surprising speed and deftness. Wherever the threat loomed largest on his borders, his army seemed able to spring to meet it and drive it back.
Frederick's Instructions to his generals include detailed plans for invading the regions neighboring Prussia. They take into careful account the differing geography and populations of each region. The Instructions also analyze the specific nature and personality of Prussian soldiers, that set them apart from the soldiers of other nations, and suited them to certain kinds of warfare more than others.
The Instructions were top secret, printed only in a limited edition. Each Prussian general was instructed, upon receipt of his copy, to never take it with him into the field. When finally one such general was captured with the book on his person, it was immediately translated into every European language, and widely distributed. Napoleon held Frederick's ideas in high esteem. Von Clausewitz points to Frederick the Great repeatedly, as an example of excellence in the "art of war".
Napoleon Bonaparte
Widely considered to be one of the greatest generals of all time, Napoleon had a lot of opinions about warfare, but never bothered to write them all down in one place. Several collections of his maxims, proverbs, and recommendations have been made over the years. The one I read was compiled in 1794(?), and attempts to present the ones that are universal while omitting all those relating to specific details that will change from time to time and place to place.
One of the most notable concepts Napoleon introduced was attacking from the march. Other armies, from the Romans onward, had an order of battle that was different from their order of march. It was a time-consuming and complicated process to transition an army from its traveling configuration to its fighting configuration.
Napoleon devised a way to launch an assault against an enemy from the marching configuration. Thus he could move his army into contact with the enemy, and just keep up that motion right into them while they were still in the process of transitioning. Even if they were already in position, Napoleon's troops could still save time and maintain their momentum by using this tactic.
To be continued...
A few years back, Mrs. C. bought me a reprinted collection of works by military theorists. It was originally published in the early 20th century (between WW1 and WW2). Lately I've been working my way through them.
Vegetius
This guy was a historian in the later period of the Roman Empire. He took it upon himself to review earlier Greek and Roman military theories and practices, and compile a summary of the high points. The stated purpose of the work was to advise the current Roman emperor of the best way to (re)organize his army, which like the rest of Rome had become decadent and weak.
The result is a surprisingly simple, straightforward book. It covers such topics as recruiting standards, equipment and training, order of battle, and establishment of camps. It also describes the chain of command and the duties of the officers of various ranks. And of course it reviews the Roman system of battle.
One of the most interesting arguments Vegetius makes is that the Roman armies of old were victorious in part because of their small size. Larger armies become too difficult to manage; better to field a smaller army, well trained and confident in the strength of its arms, under the direct command of a single general. He cites several historical examples of smaller, more agile Roman armies handily defeating much larger, unwieldy enemies.
Supposedly Vegetius was very highly regarded by strategists and generals during the Middle Ages. This makes sense, since the arms of that time would not have been much different from the arms of the Roman Empire.
De Saxe
A German officer who spent most of his career in French service, De Saxe formed his opinions of warfare during the early days of gunpowder, and it shows in his writing.
De Saxe proposed a reform of the armies of the day, into smaller units along classical Roman lines. He is credited by some military historians as being the father of the modern division-based army organization.
Gunpowder weapons being much less reliable and effective then than they later became, De Saxe argued against the practice of having the infantry fire while they advanced. He saw this as a waste of time that interrupted their charge, robbed them of their forward momentum, and left them vulnerable to a more aggressive opponent. He preferred the infantry to charge directly into hand-to-hand combat, exploiting the weakness of an enemy that had not taken his advice.
He had several other innovative recommendations, including a lightweight field gun that could move and fire in support of infantry action, rather than the larger artillery pieces, which comprised a separate arm of their own.
My favorite part of De Saxe's work is his note at the end, where he explains that he had written the entire thing during a seven day period while suffering from a fever, for his own amusement.
De Saxe was reportedly very popular with the strategists and commanders who came after him, throughout the Napoleonic period.
Frederick the Great
De Saxe died before gunpowder weapons technology had improved very much, and before anybody had gotten around to trying the reforms he suggested.
Frederick II, King of Prussia, deserves a lot of credit for putting De Saxe's ideas into practice, and also for coming up with many excellent ideas of his own.
As a young man, Frederick wanted nothing more than to be an artist. He even ran away to England to get away from his father, who had a more martial career in mind for him. But when his father died, and Frederick took the throne, he transformed into one of the greatest warlords in the history of the western world.
At that time, Prussia was a small nation with large, belligerent neighbors eager to add this tasty morsel to their domains. They would even form alliances with each other, for the purpose of conquering Prussia and dividing the spoils amongst themselves.
Frederick dealt with this problem by forming a well-trained, highly mobile army. He was renowned for the rapidity of his marches, and his ability to deploy his forces with surprising speed and deftness. Wherever the threat loomed largest on his borders, his army seemed able to spring to meet it and drive it back.
Frederick's Instructions to his generals include detailed plans for invading the regions neighboring Prussia. They take into careful account the differing geography and populations of each region. The Instructions also analyze the specific nature and personality of Prussian soldiers, that set them apart from the soldiers of other nations, and suited them to certain kinds of warfare more than others.
The Instructions were top secret, printed only in a limited edition. Each Prussian general was instructed, upon receipt of his copy, to never take it with him into the field. When finally one such general was captured with the book on his person, it was immediately translated into every European language, and widely distributed. Napoleon held Frederick's ideas in high esteem. Von Clausewitz points to Frederick the Great repeatedly, as an example of excellence in the "art of war".
Napoleon Bonaparte
Widely considered to be one of the greatest generals of all time, Napoleon had a lot of opinions about warfare, but never bothered to write them all down in one place. Several collections of his maxims, proverbs, and recommendations have been made over the years. The one I read was compiled in 1794(?), and attempts to present the ones that are universal while omitting all those relating to specific details that will change from time to time and place to place.
One of the most notable concepts Napoleon introduced was attacking from the march. Other armies, from the Romans onward, had an order of battle that was different from their order of march. It was a time-consuming and complicated process to transition an army from its traveling configuration to its fighting configuration.
Napoleon devised a way to launch an assault against an enemy from the marching configuration. Thus he could move his army into contact with the enemy, and just keep up that motion right into them while they were still in the process of transitioning. Even if they were already in position, Napoleon's troops could still save time and maintain their momentum by using this tactic.
To be continued...
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