Western Military Theorists I Have Read Lately

In Chronological Order

A few years back, Mrs. C. bought me a reprinted collection of works by military theorists. It was originally published in the early 20th century (between WW1 and WW2). Lately I've been working my way through them.

Vegetius
This guy was a historian in the later period of the Roman Empire. He took it upon himself to review earlier Greek and Roman military theories and practices, and compile a summary of the high points. The stated purpose of the work was to advise the current Roman emperor of the best way to (re)organize his army, which like the rest of Rome had become decadent and weak.

The result is a surprisingly simple, straightforward book. It covers such topics as recruiting standards, equipment and training, order of battle, and establishment of camps. It also describes the chain of command and the duties of the officers of various ranks. And of course it reviews the Roman system of battle.

One of the most interesting arguments Vegetius makes is that the Roman armies of old were victorious in part because of their small size. Larger armies become too difficult to manage; better to field a smaller army, well trained and confident in the strength of its arms, under the direct command of a single general. He cites several historical examples of smaller, more agile Roman armies handily defeating much larger, unwieldy enemies.

Supposedly Vegetius was very highly regarded by strategists and generals during the Middle Ages. This makes sense, since the arms of that time would not have been much different from the arms of the Roman Empire.

De Saxe
A German officer who spent most of his career in French service, De Saxe formed his opinions of warfare during the early days of gunpowder, and it shows in his writing.

De Saxe proposed a reform of the armies of the day, into smaller units along classical Roman lines. He is credited by some military historians as being the father of the modern division-based army organization.

Gunpowder weapons being much less reliable and effective then than they later became, De Saxe argued against the practice of having the infantry fire while they advanced. He saw this as a waste of time that interrupted their charge, robbed them of their forward momentum, and left them vulnerable to a more aggressive opponent. He preferred the infantry to charge directly into hand-to-hand combat, exploiting the weakness of an enemy that had not taken his advice.

He had several other innovative recommendations, including a lightweight field gun that could move and fire in support of infantry action, rather than the larger artillery pieces, which comprised a separate arm of their own.

My favorite part of De Saxe's work is his note at the end, where he explains that he had written the entire thing during a seven day period while suffering from a fever, for his own amusement.

De Saxe was reportedly very popular with the strategists and commanders who came after him, throughout the Napoleonic period.

Frederick the Great
De Saxe died before gunpowder weapons technology had improved very much, and before anybody had gotten around to trying the reforms he suggested.

Frederick II, King of Prussia, deserves a lot of credit for putting De Saxe's ideas into practice, and also for coming up with many excellent ideas of his own.

As a young man, Frederick wanted nothing more than to be an artist. He even ran away to England to get away from his father, who had a more martial career in mind for him. But when his father died, and Frederick took the throne, he transformed into one of the greatest warlords in the history of the western world.

At that time, Prussia was a small nation with large, belligerent neighbors eager to add this tasty morsel to their domains. They would even form alliances with each other, for the purpose of conquering Prussia and dividing the spoils amongst themselves.

Frederick dealt with this problem by forming a well-trained, highly mobile army. He was renowned for the rapidity of his marches, and his ability to deploy his forces with surprising speed and deftness. Wherever the threat loomed largest on his borders, his army seemed able to spring to meet it and drive it back.

Frederick's Instructions to his generals include detailed plans for invading the regions neighboring Prussia. They take into careful account the differing geography and populations of each region. The Instructions also analyze the specific nature and personality of Prussian soldiers, that set them apart from the soldiers of other nations, and suited them to certain kinds of warfare more than others.

The Instructions were top secret, printed only in a limited edition. Each Prussian general was instructed, upon receipt of his copy, to never take it with him into the field. When finally one such general was captured with the book on his person, it was immediately translated into every European language, and widely distributed. Napoleon held Frederick's ideas in high esteem. Von Clausewitz points to Frederick the Great repeatedly, as an example of excellence in the "art of war".

Napoleon Bonaparte
Widely considered to be one of the greatest generals of all time, Napoleon had a lot of opinions about warfare, but never bothered to write them all down in one place. Several collections of his maxims, proverbs, and recommendations have been made over the years. The one I read was compiled in 1794(?), and attempts to present the ones that are universal while omitting all those relating to specific details that will change from time to time and place to place.

One of the most notable concepts Napoleon introduced was attacking from the march. Other armies, from the Romans onward, had an order of battle that was different from their order of march. It was a time-consuming and complicated process to transition an army from its traveling configuration to its fighting configuration.

Napoleon devised a way to launch an assault against an enemy from the marching configuration. Thus he could move his army into contact with the enemy, and just keep up that motion right into them while they were still in the process of transitioning. Even if they were already in position, Napoleon's troops could still save time and maintain their momentum by using this tactic.

To be continued...